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ABSTRACT 
This paper defines a risk assessment mechanism and 
compares its incentive properties with those of deterministic 
incentive mechanisms, particularly the Groves mechanism. 
Many risk assessments involve prediction for rare or 
unique events; in such cases there is limited opportunity for 
feedback and evaluation of the assessment process. To develop 
a feedback mechanism, the paper requires assessments to be made 
for indicator events. linked to the rare or unique events of 
ultimate interest. Assessments are made by several assessors, 
or assessment techniques, acting in competition. The feedback 
mechanism is a transfer function based on the probability 
assessments of all the assessors and the outcome of the 
indicator event. 
The incentive properties of risk assessment mechanisms 
are in some ways similar to those for deterministic mechanisms 
and in some ways quite different. The paper defines one risk 
assessment mechanism that looks like a Groves mechanism: it 
directly reveals probability and for risk neutral assessors has 
an unbiased or truthful dominant strategy which is 
discontinuous and which cannot solve the budget problem. The 
paper also defines a class of risk assessment mechanisms which 
do not look like a Groves mechanism; mechanisms in this class 
have unbiased dominant strategies which are continuous and 
which do solve the budget problem. 
April 2 3 ,  1982 
* 
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
Talbot Page 
The purpose of this paper is to apply ideas from the theory of 
incentive compatibility for public goods demand revelation to the 
problem of probability revelation in risk assessment.  There are several 
reasons for doing this : to extend the theory to a new case , which is 
probabilistic and where there need not be public goods; to provide 
a mechanism of feedback for learning and validation; and to generalize 
the notion of scoring rules . The link between the theory of incentive 
compatibility for public goods and risk assessment is achieved by a 
structural analogy between two models , one for public goods and the 
other for risk assessment . The analogy is neither a generalization 
nor a specialization -- different variables play parallel roles and 
there are some changed roles , too .  Because there are both parallels 
and differences , part of the basic theorems of Groves and Loeb (]975) 
and Green and Laffont (1979) characterizing demand relevation for 
public goods carry over to the risk assessment model ,  but there are 
surprises as well.  
Transfer functions can be viewed as the centerpiece of models 
of demand revelation for public goods . In this paper we take the 
same view toward transfer functions for risk assessment . The motivation 
for doing so is practical as well as conceptual . There are now a large 
number of risk assessments , which are increasingly used in decisions 
with potentially large scale consequences . In risk assessment much 
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of the focus has been forward looking -- developing estimates of 
probabilities for future events ,  or for the likelihood of the existence 
of some state which is not yet known. There has been relatively little 
backward looking -- looking back to evaluate previous risk assessments 
in the light of new information when it becomes available . The transfer 
function provides a means for increasing the emphasis on feedback.  
In risk assessment we are interested in developing estimates of 
the probability of some event , which might be rare (a reactor core 
meltdown) or unique (chemical X is a carcinogen) . There is a principal 
who makes use of these estimates for some decision. The principal has 
no direct information of his own on the probability of the event , but 
relies on the probability estimates provided by agents or assessors . 
The assessors have information on the state of nature and form inferences 
on the probability of the event . In general we assume that the assessors 
have differing amounts and qualities of information . 
As part of an introduction, we can speak loosely of three goals 
for a princ ipal in an assessment process: (a) to produce a "good" 
consensus estimate among N assessors; (b) to identify , over a 
limited number of assessment rounds,  assessors who have better 
information or inference skills (or "assessment technique") ; (c) and 
to provide incentives , relative to the principal' s  budget , to make it 
worthwhile for the agents to gather information and form probability 
judgments , a costly exercise . (The desirata -- "good" consensus 
estimator , "identifiability" of the "best" assessors , and "sharp" 
incentives -- can be made precise only within contexts of specified 
models . )  As a means toward some mix of these goals , the principal 
agrees to reward the assessors by a transfer mechanism, which is a 
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function of the revealed probability estimates and whether or not the 
predicted event occurs (in the appropriate time interval) .  For 
the first goal , a "good" consensus estimate is defined as good 
for some decision purpose. The idea corresponds to the public 
goods model , where willingnesses to pay are elicited in ways 
leading to Pareto optimality and the truthfulness of the revelations is 
"incidental . "  For the third goal , it is useful that the expected 
transfer to an assessor be a "sharp" rather than "flat" function of 
his revealed estimate. The idea corresponds to the desiratum of 
"individual rationality" in the public goods model . 1
It is assumed that the assessors have a single goal; to do "as 
best they can" in response to a given transfer mechanism. The focus 
of the paper will be on this latter question -- how the assessors 
might respond to or manipulate various possible transfer mechanisms . 
A rationale for the focus is that no matter what mix of goals the 
principal might have , he will be unable to pick a transfer mechanism 
until he knows something of how the agents might respond to it . 
The most basic result in the paper is the development of a new 
and more formal framework for risk assessment . More specific results 
are : 
(1) The idea of a Groves mechanism is applied to the risk 
assessment model and a new mechanism is defined for revealing best , 
truthful probability estimates.  There are both parallels and contrasts . 
For one thing there is no public good in the risk assessment model . 
(2) In the risk assessment model ,  there are other direct 
revelation mechanisms , besides the Groves-like one, with truthful dominant 
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strategies for agents with linear , separable utilities (risk neutrality) . 
This is in contrast with the public goods model, where the Groves 
mechanism is the only direct revelation mechanism with truthful 
dominant strategies for agents with linear , separable utilities (no 
income effects) . However , finding other mechanisms with truthful 
dominant strategies in the risk assessment model is not a new result. 
These mechanisms are built on proper scoring rules , which have been 
known for forty years .  New results are: the mechanisms built on proper 
scoring rules can be defined to achieve budget balance and to eliminate 
the requirement of risk neutrality ; and the requirement of risk 
neutrality can also be eliminated for the Groves-like mechanism while 
preserving its truthful dominant strategies . But it does not appear 
possible to achieve budget balance for the Groves-like mechanism in the 
risk assessment model . 
(3) Even though the Groves-like mechanism and proper scoring rules 
look very different, there is a close connection between them. One 
of the proper scoring rules , the Brier rule, is shown to be a special 
case of the Groves-like mechanism from the point of view of a risk 
neutral assessor . 
(4) Under slight restrictions, a Nash equilibrium is shown to 
exist for the parimutuel betting rule. This widely used transfer
mechanism is especially interesting from the point of view of risk 
assessment because not only is it the most prominant example of 
assessment mechanism in actual operation, it is also closely related 
to Bayesian inference .  
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(5) The expected value maximizing strategy is derived for the 
parimutuel mechanism. For a particular model of the assessors ' 
information, this mechanism is shown to be more efficient than the 
Brier rule in identifying the best assessor over a limited number of 
assessment rounds . This is an interesting result because the Brier 
rule has been used to distinguish among assessment abilities of 
weather forecasters . It is interesting for another reason as well: 
the parimutuel mechanism has a non-truthful dominant strategy . Thus 
it is possible to find a manipulative mechanism superior in a least 
one respect to a truth revealing dominant strategy mechanism. But 
as a final surprise,  for this same model of the assessors' information , 
the Groves-like mechanism , which also has a truth revealing dominant 
strategy , identifies the better informed assessor more efficiently 
than either of the other two mechanisms . Equivalence in expectation 
between the Brier rule and a special case of the Groves-like 
mechanism one does not imply equivalence in other aspects of the 
rules ' behavior. 
Concern with incentive compatibility in risk assessment goes 
back at least to 1950,  when Brier (1950) proposed a forecasting 
verification system which would be immune to manipulation , or 
as he put it , "playing the system . "  Savage (1971) devoted his 
last paper to the problem of eliciting truthful revelation of 
each assessor ' s  best j udgmental probability estimate (truthful 
revelation rules for expected value maximizing assessors came to be 
known as proper scoring rules) .  Recently Grether has developed 
a procedure, not depending on risk neutrality, for truthful 
revelation of probability estimates . 
The work j ust cited can be viewed in the context of 2 person 
games a single assessor versus nature , with the game established and 
overseen by the principal .  There appears t o  b e  little previous work on 
the problem addressed in this paper , which can be viewed as an N + 1 
person game , where N assessors may affect each other ' s  transfer , 
and where there may be strategic manipulation of the mechanism in terms 
of one assessor against each other. Page (1977) stated this problem 
of manipulative competition among N risk assessors and considered a 
Bayesian transfer rule because it might have useful properties for the 
principal . However , the strategic analysis was not carried far and 
there appears to be little existing work on the strategic interactions 
among competing assessors . 
On a related subj ect ,  calibration and the evaluation of judgmental 
probability assessment , there has been a great deal of work. 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff , and Phillies (1981) provide a recent summary , 
and their own work on the subj ect needs particular mention here, as 
does the work by Winker and Murphy, who have contributed especially on 
the evaluation of probabilistic weather forecasting . As a means of 
identifying the "best" assessor Roberts (1965) suggested a Bayesian 
scoring rule , but he did not consider its strategic properties, 
a few of which are discussed by Winkler (1969) . 
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I .  Analogy Between Models of Incentive Compatibility for 
Public Goods and Risk Assessment 
Definition. A risk assessment mechanism is a function 
f • (t1 , • • • tN) ' where ti is the transfer to i ;  ti is a function of
p1 , • • • pN and X ;  pi is i's revealed probability estimate; and X is
the assessed event.  The strategy space for each i is [0,1], and X can 
be either 0 or 1 . 2
The analogy between a model of incentives compatibility and a 
model of risk assessment is drawn in Table 1 and the subsequent 
paragraphs . 
Table 1 
Public Goods Model Risk Assessment Model 
uo (l:ti)
0 Utility function U (l:ti ,K,X) for the principal � < 0 u� < o 
Utility function i ui (ti ,zi) =ti+gi (zi)for agent i 
U (ti ,K)at1+g1 (K) 
u i < 0 2 
Transfer ti•f1Cw1•···•wN) ti•fi (P1••••tPN ,X)
mechanism 
Decision function K'"d (w1 , ••• ,wN) K•d (p1 , • • •  ,pN, I)for the principal 
B 
As part of the analogy wi (revealed willingness to pay in the 
demand revelation model) corresponds to pi (revealed probability 
estimate in the risk assessment model) .  Underlying wi is vi (i ' s  true
valuation) which corresponds to pi (i's true or "best" probability
assessment ) .  In the public goods model K is a public good for the N 
i 0 agents; K appears in U without the subscript ,  but not in U • In 
the risk assessment model the situation is reversed. K is a 
private good appearing in u0 but not in the Ui. The public goods 
model is an N person non-cooperative game among the N voters or 
agents , overseen by the principal who receives (or pays) the 
transfers . The risk assessment model is an N+l person non-cooperative 
game, like the N+l person game developed by Harsanyi and recently 
applied by Milgram and Roberts (1982) .  The extra player is nature, 
which "decides" on the existence of some (possibly unique) event X.  The 
state of X is not known to the N assessors at the time of their 
revelations . The state of X is revealed after the pi are revealed 
and the transfer ti is based on the observed state of X along with
the pi . 
For example, each of N forecasters makes a probability prediction 
of rain tomorrow. The following day the forecasters are given 
transfers as functions of the revea1ed predictions (p1 , • • • , pN) and 
whether or not it rained . The dimensionality of K in the demand 
revelation model corresponds to the dimensionality of X in the risk 
assessment model , in the following way . If K is dichotomous (K = 1 
means the public good is chosen , K = 0 means the status quo is 
preserved) ,  only a single value for willingness to pay is elicited 
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from each agent. Similarly if X is dichotomous (X = 1 means 
rain; X 0 means no rain) , only a single probability is elicited . 
If K is continuous in the demand revelation model , then an entire 
willingness-to-pay schedule is elicited. Similarly if X is 
continuous a probability density function is elicited . 
In the demand revelation model , it is assumed that agents 
know their true valuations (the vi) at no cos t .  In contrast , to
form a probability judgment requires assessment activity .  T o  keep 
matters simple we will assume that i can form at least a crude 
best guess pi at no cost . But for i to refine his judgment pi 
"more" assessment activity zi is required . The more information
which is gathered and processed (the higher zi) ,  the more costly
the assessment activity to i .  We will say a few words later about 
"better" judgments of probability of X and the costs of attaining 
them in Section VII . 
II. Existence of a Groves-like Mechanism 
The idea of the Graves-like mechanism is as follows. Each of 
N assessors makes his own assessment of the probability of the event 
X.  Each i reports a probability pi of the event without knowing the
others ' reported assessments .  For each assessor i ,  the consensus of 
the other N-1 assessors is defined and specified qi . Then if
the event occurs, i wins if pi > qi (his reported probability is
higher than the others' consensus) and i loses if pi < qi . And if
the event does not occur , i wins if pi < qi and i loses if pi > qi .
How much he wins in each case is determined by the others' consensus . 
The amount of a win and the resolution of ties is provided by the 
definition: 
N 
Definition. Define q .. L pici as the consensus of all thei=l 
assessors and q =i 
N 
L p.cj / (l - ci)Jili J 
N 
as the consensus of all but i ,  
where for all i 0 � Gi < 1 and L Ci - 1 .i-=l 
Then the Graves-like risk 
assessment mechanism ti = fi (p1 , . . •  ,pN,X) is defined by 
.
{l - qi
ti "' qi
0 
if X • 1 and Pi � qi
if X = 0 and Pi < qi
otherwise 
For short we will refer to this transfer function as mechanism f .  
In the symmetric case ci -= l/N and 
N 
_  
1 L pr qi - ll - 1 j;i
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We can think of the c1 as the credibility weights used in defining
the consensus estimates. To stress the parallel the following theorem 
is proved for assessors with linear, separable utility (risk 
neutrality for the risk assessment model, no income effects for 
the public goods model). 
Theorem 1. Mechanism f has a truth revealing dominant strategy 
for each risk neutral, expected value maximizing assessor. Moreover, 
truthful revelation is the unique dominant strategy. 
�· We will show that truthful revelation is the unique dominant
strategy for any risk neutral assessor i. For convenience, omit the 
subscript from pi' qi' ti and pi <Pi is i's truthful best judgment of
P(X=l)). If p � q, i's expected transfer from his point of view is 
E(t) • p - pq; and if p < q, E(t) • q - pq. For any p there are three 
possible cases: q > p, q < p, and q a "lf· We consider the three
cases and all the possible subcases in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Subcase Strategy Expected Transfer 
-
(la) p=p<q truthful revelation q - pq 
Case 1 (lb) p<p<q biased down q - 1fq 
q > p (le) p<p<q biased up q - pq 
(ld) p<� biased up p - pq 
Case 2 
(2a) q<p=p truthful revelation "P" - pq 
q < p 
(2b) QS><il biased down p - pq 
(2c) p<q<p biased down q - pq 
(2d) q<p<p biased up p - Jl"q 
Case 3 (3a) q=p=p truthful revelation p - pl 
q = p (3b) 
p<q=p biased down P"-r 
(3c) q=p<p biased up p - p2
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The expected transfer in subcase (ld) is smaller than for (la), 
(lb), and (le) because in case 1 q > p; and the expected transfer 
in (2c) is smaller than in (2a), (2b) and (2d) because in case 2 
q < p. So in each case truthful revelation is a least as good and 
sometimes better than any alternative strategy. This implies that 
truthful revelation is a dominant strategy. From the enumeration of 
cases, it is clear that no other strategy is at least as good as 
truthful revelation in all cases. Thus truthful revelation is the 
unique dominant strategy. 
Q.E.D. 
Like the Groves mechanism the decision of who wins (who pays in 
the public goods model) is split from the decision of how much a winner 
gets (how much is paid). The decision of whether or not i wins depends 
on all the p
j 
and on X. How much depends only on p
j 
for j ; i, and
on X. Each i's expected return is discontinuous with the point of 
discontinuity at the point qi. The close parallel (and difference)
between the two mechanisms is shown in Figure 1.3
A major difference between the two models is that Theorem 1 can be 
strengthened by modifying mechanism f and dropping the assumption of 
linear, separable utility. In its place we substitute the weaker 
assumption of monotoxicity of preferences over lotteries.4 This is
done in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2. Define pi and qi as in Theorem 1, and define
ti = fi<P1·P2·····PN,X), by
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1 w.p. 1 - qi ) if x "' 1 and Pi � qi0 w.p. qi
1 w.p . qi )ti = i if x s O and pi < qi0 w.p. 1 - qi
0 otherwise 
Then, if i's preferences over lotteries are monotonic, mechanism 
f' = (fi •···f�) has a truthful dominant strategy, and truthful
relevation is the unique dominant strategy. 
Proof. Construct a table of subcases, which looks 
like Table 1 except for the heading on the third column. This time the 
entries in the third column refer to probabilities of winning a lottery. 
For each subcase there is a lottery of winning 1 unit with same 
probability s and of winning 0 with probability 1 - s. For each 
subcase the values for s are shown in the third column. Inspection of 
Table 1 shows that for any i with monotonic preferences over lotteries 
truthful revelation is the unique dominant strategy. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2 turns on the fact that the transfer to i in Theorem 1 
is bounded between zero and l, a fact obvious from the definition 
of f. The following definitions will prove useful. 
Definitions. For a given 
- + define b = inf. ti; b = sup. 
transfer mechanism g = (t1, ... ,t )
N n - � + ti; B = inf. L ti; and B • sup. i=l 
N 
l t '
i=l i 
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where pi can vary over [O,l] and X can either be 0 or 1.
- + Definition. If B c B we say that the principal's budget is
controlled at level B. 
Budget control corresponds to the condition of "balanced budget" 
for the public goods model. Budget control or balance means that the 
principal knows the cost of the transfer mechanisms beforehand; it 
also facilitates comparisons among transfer mechanisms. It is easy 
to see that the Groves-like mechanism does not have budget control. 
For a counter example, note for N=2, if X=l and pl > Pz• Lti = 1 - Pz 
which varies with Pz• 
III. 
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Mechanisms with Truthful Dominant Strategies, 
Budget Control, and Continuity 
We know that in the public goods model the Groves mechanism 
is the only direct relevation mechanism with a truthful dominant 
strategy. The situation is quite different for the risk assessment 
model. Here there are an infinite number of direct revelation 
mechanisms with truthful dominant strategies. These other mechanisms 
are not "Groves-like" -- they are continuous and have budget CDntrol. 
These mechanisms are based on proper scoring rules. 
Definition. A risk assessment mechanism is a scoring rule if 
it can be written in the form ti = g(pi,X). (The transfer to each 
agent depends only on what he reveals and X.) 
Definition. A proper scoring rule is a scoring rule ti = g(pi,X) 
for which the expected transfer E(g(pi,X)) is maximized at pi = pi' 
for each i. 
Definition. An assessment mechanism g is normalizable if the 
range of g is bounded. If 
normalized. 
- + b • 0 and b • 1 we will say g is 
Definition. An assessment mechanism g is individually rational if 
b- > o. 
Because we are assuming each i can form at least a crude guess 
of the probability of X costlessly, i cannot lose when b- � 0 .  The 
condition of "individual rationality" means i has an incentive to 
join in an assessment process (except for very pathological cases where 
he has no in�entive to either join or not join). An advantage in 
working with normalized mechanisms is that the zero floor 
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provides "individual rationality. " The unit ceiling for normalized 
proper scoring rules will prove useful below. (Note that the 
Groves-like mechanism is normalized. ) 
Examples. (1) ti • g(pi,X) • 1 - (p - X)
2 
(2) ti• g(pi,x) • l ei - xi/� e/ + (1 - ei>2 
The first is the Brier scoring rule, which bas been extensively 
used in the evaluation of weather forecasters. The second is the 
spherical rule. It is easy to show that both are proper and normalized. 
It is well known that there are an infinite number of proper scoring 
rules (and an infinite subclass can be normalized, maintaining properness). 
Theorem 3 .  Let g(pi,X) be a continuous, normalized proper scoring 
rule • Define 
ti: gf(P1•···•Pn•X) 1 
N 
- g(pi,X) + 1 - N-1 l g(pj,X). j,li 
Then g' = (t1, • • •  ,�) is a risk assessment mechanism with truthful 
dominant strateiges for risk neutral assessors. Further, g' has 
budget control, is continuous, and provides "individual rationality." 
Proof. To show that truthful revelation is the dominant 
stragety for any i, note that the expected transfer to i is 
(3) E(ti) = E(g(pi
,X)) + k(p,p1•···•Pi-l' Pi+l' """pN) 
for some function k. Since k does not depend on pi, the pi which 
maximizes E(g(pi,X)) also maximizes E(ti). Because g is a proper 
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scoring rule, we know the max:!.mization of E(ti) is at pis pi. 
As g is continuous so is gi· As g(pj,X) � 1 (all j), we know
1 N 1 > N-l l g(pj ,X) and since g(pj ,X) � O, we know gf � 0j,li 
no matter what are the pj and X, meeting the condition of "individual 
rationality. "  To show that g' has budget control, note that 
N 
l 
i=l 
t = i 
N 
l g(pi,X) + N - �
l� 
i=l N-1 
N 
l 
i=l 
N 
l g(pJ, ,X) "' N. j,li 
Q.E. D. 
The normalization "wraps around" partial sums in such a way 
that the total sum comes out constant. The idea is 
similar to the one used by Walker (1981) to define an incentive 
compatible mechanism for public goods. The normalization which 
defines g' is not directly useful to the Groves-like mechanism f 
because it would introduce all the p in the residual function k.� i 
As in Theorem 2 we can discard the assumption of risk neutrality 
for proper scoring rules in favor of the weaker assumption of 
monotonicity. 
Theorem 4 .  Let g be a normalized proper scoring rule, and define 
the mechanism of transfer to i, by { 1 with probability g(pi,X) t = i O with probability 1 - g(pi,X) 
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Then if i's preferences over lotteries are monotonic, i has a 
truthful dominant strategy. 
Proof. Because g is normalized 0 � g � 1 and g can be defined as a 
probability, the proof is parallel to Theorem 2. 
While Theorems 2 and 4 generalize 1 and 2, the presence or
absence of risk aversion tends to be less important an issue when there 
are R assessment rounds and i's average transfer converges to the 
average of his expected transfers.5 
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IV. Link Between the Groves-like Mechanism and the Brier Rule. 
So far we have said little about i's beliefs concerning the other 
pj at the time i reveals his own pi. For the Brier rule these beliefs 
have no impact on i's expected transfer. For mechanism f � they do. 
But in the special case when i has a diffuse prior over qi (the consensus 
of others' revealed probabilities) the two mechanisms are very closely 
related. Define mechanism f' as identical to the Groves-like 
mechanism f except all the transfers are doubled. 
Theorem 5. When i has a diffuse prior on qi, the expected 
transfer to i for mechanism f' is the same as for the Brier rule, for 
all pi and pi. 
Proof. For a diffuse prior on qi' i's expected transfer 
E(ti) is, for any particular pi and pi 
Ipi fl E(ti j pi � q)dq + E(ti J pi < q)dq. 0 p i 
By the definition of f and f' we know E(ti J pi �qi) • 2pi - 2piqi 
and E(ti J pi
' 
< qi) = 2qi - piqi. Making the substitutions leads to 
2 -
E(ti) s -pi + 2pipi + 1 - Pi· 
2 Recall that the Brier rule is defined by g(pi,X) • 1 - (pi - X) 
for i = l, • • •  ,N. The expected transfer to i under this rule is 
- 2 - 2 2 - -pi(l - (pi - l) )  + (l - pi)(l - pi ) = -pi + 2PiPi + l - Pi· 
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The expectations for the two mechanisms are identical. 
Q.E.D. 
Thus, from the point of view of an expected value maximizing 
assessor who bas a diffuse prior on the consensus of others' judgments, 
the Groves-like mechanism f' and the Brier rule are equivalent. However, 
a diffuse prior on qi is a rather unlikely benchmark. If i bad no 
information on any of the other p., it would seem more natural to 
J 
assume a diffuse prior on each pj, which would tend toward a 
concentrated distribution for qi by the central limit theorem. Moreover, 
it would seem plausible for i to assume that others would have some 
of the same information about the likelihood of X as i himself has. 
In this case i would adopt a prior for each pj concentrated around pi. 
A tractible case of a concentrated prior is considered in the next 
section. 
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v Sharpness in Expected Transfer. 
For the mechanism f' suppose i has a prior on qi concentrated 
around pi' where i's subjective density function b(qi) is a triangle
peaked on qi, and defined by 
h(q) 
{2q/p 
s 
2(1 - q)/(l - p) 
if q � p 
if q > p 
where again the subscript i is omitted. For p � p, i's expected transfer 
is 
-
E(t) s1:p (l - q)(2q/p)dq +f :(l - p)q(2q/p)dq Oil p 
And for p > P 
+ 
-
2(1 - p)q(2(1 - q)/(l - p))dq 
p 
-2 2 3 -
s (2/3)(1 - p )  + 2p - (4/3)p /p 
E(<) -��(! - q)(2q/Pldq ·�·tp(l - q)(2(1 - q)/(l - p))dq 
1 �2q(l - PlC2(1 - q)/(l - Plldq 
So 
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-2 -3 2 3 - 2p - (4/3)p - 2p + (4/3)p + 2/3 + 
....§:.._ 2 3 - 2 3 1 - lf (p - p . + p /3 - p + p - p /3) 
2 I - ,-a E(t p < p) • 4 - Sp p 
ilp2 
-
2 - - -and �a�. E(t jp � p) s -4(1 - p) - Sp(l - p)/(l - p) 
p2 
At the optimal p s p the left hand second derivative is -4 and the 
right hand second derivative is -4 - 4p. But the second derivative 
for the Brier rule is -2 everywhere. Thus compared with the Brier 
rule, mechanism f' (with t he triangular prior) has a sharper radius of 
curvature at the optimal p • p. From the point of view of the 
assessor who maximizes his expected transfer, mechanism f' has a 
greater incentive than the Brier rule for an accurate assessment. 
Because there is no budget control for either mechanism 
f' or the Brier rule, there is no direct budget comparability from 
the point of view of the principal. But we might expect about half 
the assessors for mechanism f to get nothing (those i on the "wrong" 
side of qi). Further, those i on the "right" side of qi receive a 
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linear function of qi scaled from 0 to 1. For the Brier rule 
everyone receives a quadratic (concave upward) function of their 
own pi' scaled from 0 to 1. Thus it is possible that for many cases 
mechani&m f and even the twice-as-expensive f' may cost less than 
the Brier rule. In Section VII we return to the question of sharpness, 
but first we consider the problem of identifying the "best" assessor 
over a series of assessments. 
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VI. On the Definition of the Best Assessor 
This section develops a notion of the best assessor. "Best" 
becomes definable in a context of a model of the assessor's information. 
If defined sensibly, the principal would like to identify the best 
assessor, the second best, and so on. He would also like to uncover the 
information structure which relates the assessors' revealed estimates 
to each other. In practice the principal may have to settle for much 
less. 
In a practical problem such as risk assessment for chemical 
carcinogens there might be five or ten experts assessing the potential 
carcinogenicity of 30 or 40 chemicals. Each expert makes a 
probabilistic prediction that a chemical will come out positive in a 
"definitive" rodent bioassay, costing $750,000 and taking three years to 
perform. The predictive probabilities pi might be used to help
decide on the degree of precautionary control to take for each 
chemical during the time of testing. Or, for the part of the problem 
we are now interested in, they might be used, in conjunction with the 
outcomes of the bioassays, to identify the better predictive techniques. 
One assessor might rely heavily on the Ames test, another on a 
structure-activity model, and so on. The principal would like to 
identify the predictor with the best "track record, " to rely more 
heavily on this technique or to invest more in its development. But 
the principal is severely constrained in his source of information. 
Because the rodent bioassays are so expensive only 20 or 30 are 
undertaken nationally in a year. 
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It would be desirable for the principal to estimate a parameter 
of bias and a parameter of central tendency for each assessor's 
estimate, along with estimates of the statistical dependencies among 
the assessors' estimators. As such parameters depend on the underlying 
maintained model, it would also be desirable to identify this 
underlying structure of information. 
However, there is just not much information in the observation 
of 30 or 40 yes-no events, which can be accumulated in 3 or 4 years 
of a testing program � not enough to support the estimation of many 
parameters and to identify or validate an underlying model. From a 
lack of information, the principal may have to settle for a crude notion 
of "best" and identifiability. 
The key idea is this. If each assessor's "technique" (information 
quality and inference skill) remains constant over a series of 
assessments, then there is some possibility of detecting assessors with 
better techniques, even though each assessment is made over a unique 
and non-repeatable event and there are a limited number of assessments 
altogether. For a single assessment, the one with the best information 
and inference skill might easily be unlucky in a single prediction, 
and others with worse information and skill might be lucky. However, 
over a series of assessments, it may be possible to identify the best 
assessor with increasing probability. 
Suppose that there are R assessments to be made and each event 
Xr is unique. Concretely, Xr is a Bernoulli random variable, with 
* 
Pr(Xr 
= 1) = Pr· This probability can vary from round to round and 
can be anywhere on the closed unit interval. 'What remains constant 
is the capability of each assessor. For simplicity assume just two 
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' * assessors, 1 and 2. In round r, i s information on pr is equivalent
* 
to observing a binomial random variable with parameters (pr' Mi).
(The two binomial variables are drawn independently.) For this model 
we have a clean definition of the "best" assessor. If M1 > M2 than
the first assessor has more or better information than the second, 
and his better capability is preserved over all R rounds. Of course 
* 
i does not know p and M., in fact he might not even know�·r J * 
principal does not know M1 or M2,
 and of course not pr either. 
principal wants to identify the best assessor after R rounds. 
The 
The
If 
the assessors report truthfully, this model then is also a clear 
definition of the "best consensus estimates" for the probability of 
x : r 
aplr + (l - a)p2r
where a = �/(M1 + M2)
In other words if the assessors reported truthfully and if a were 
known, this consensus would be a sufficient statistic for the total 
* 
M1 + M2 observations from the 
Bernoulli process with parameter pr.
If the principal could estimate a accurately, and if he could elicit 
truthful reporting, he could do no better than use a and (1 - a ) as 
weights, defining the observable consensus 
q = a P1 + c1 - &>P2 r r r 
An estimate of a can be obtained by least squares, by 
minimizing over a 
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R 2 l (x - ap - (1 - a)p ) 
r=l r lr 2r 
The minimization yields 
a = 
l:(xr - P2r) (plr - P2r)
2 I:(plr - P2r) 
The principal would also have an operational definition of the best
assessor: if after R rounds, a > .5 assessor 1 is declared best; if 
a < .5, assessor 2 is declared best; and if a s .5 a tie is declared. 
There are two major problems with this approach. 
First, it is difficult to untangle how the assessors might attempt 
to manipulate this criterion of best. Suppose the principal uses 
this operational criterion of best and attempts to elicit truthful 
reporting, round by round, by rewarding the assessors according to 
repeated use of an assessment mechanism with truthful dominant 
strategy in a single round. If the assessor declared best is more 
likely to get promoted, hired as a consultant, or if the principal 
is likely to invest in the "best" assessor's technique, then each 
assessor may abandon the goal of maximizing the sum of his transfers 
in favor of maximizing the probability of being declared the best. 
If so, assessor 1 will reveal (p11, • • •  ,p1r) to maximize Pr(a > .5) and
assessor 2 will reveal (p21, • • •  ,p2r) to minimize this probability.
Or each assessor may attempt some mix of the two goals. In either 
case each assessor has an incentive to maPipulate this criterion of 
"best." And if we do not know how the assessors may manipulate the 
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criterion we do not know how good the criterion is. 
Second, the appeal of the criterion depends heavily on the 
structure of information underlying plr and p2r. For example suppose
assessor l's information on Pr(X • 1 )  is generated by observing a 
binomial random variable with parameters (ar, M1) where 
* 
a = (1 + l/M1)p r r 
* 
if (1 + l/M1)pr � 1 and a = 1r otherwise. 
Then even with truthful reporting qr is no longer an unbiased estimate 
W A 
of pr and the estimator a is no longer a least squares estimate for 
M1/(M1 + M2). The operational definition "Assessor 1 is best if
a > . 5" loses much of its appeal. 
This last problem is severe, because in actual risk assessments 
the principal knows little about how information is generated by the 
assessors. Thus he has no clearly dominant way of defining the "best" 
assessor. To achieve results we need to assume that the assessors' 
capabilities remain in some sense constant over a series of assessments, 
but beyond that we would like to assume as little as possible about 
what the principal knows of the information structure of the assessors. 
A second approach suggested by Roberts ( 1965) illustrates 
another way that one assessor's capability could remain consistantly 
better than the others over a series of assessment rounds. In the 
second example there are also N assessors. The best assessor i' knows 
* * p for each round r, and none of the others know p • Thus withoutr r 
specifying how much better i' is than j we have specified an information 
structure in which one assessor has consistently better information 
than the other, round by round. We have succeeded in specifying 
practically nothing about N - 1 assessors' structure of 
information at the expense of specifying a great deal about the 
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information of one unknown assessor. Again the principal wishes to 
identify the best assessor after R rounds. 
The principal forms N hypotheses 6i, where 6i is the 
hypothesis that i is best. The principal also forms a prior notion 
of the probability that i is best, P(Si) where EP(Si) = 1 .
As before i reveals Pir as his prediction of the event Xr .. 1. 
Write sir pir if the event happens (xt = l); and sir � 1 - pir 
if the event doesn't happen (xr = O). Write x = (x1, • • •  ,�), the 
observed record of the R events once they are known. Then if the 
assessors are revealing truthfully, � sir equals P(x l �i), the
likelihood of x given i is the best assessor. The posterior 
probability that i is the best assessor is 
(4) P(ei l x) 
P(x l ei)P(Si) 
N 
l P(x l a.)P(6j) j=l J 
P(6i) � 
l P(B.)Il 
j J r 
sir 
sjr 
In this situation Roberts suggests that the principal might 
define the best assessor as the one with the highest posterior 
probability after the R rounds. Equivalently, the principal could 
compare posterior odds, pairwise among the assessors, and select 
the assessor with a ratio always greater or equal to 1, matched 
against each of the others. If the principal has no information to 
distinguish the assessors initially, he sets the initial priors 
equal (P(Bi) = l/N). This case reduces to comparing pairwise 
the likelihood ratios for assessors. In attempting to identifJ 
the best assessor Roberts reco1JJ111ends looking at the posterior odds 
31 
as "clearly interesting," but as Roberts puts it "a complete analysis 
of the decision problem does not appear easy." Roberts does not 
consider the strategic properties of the criterion. 
A third approach is for the principal to define "best" on the 
basis of a transfer mechanism with truthful dominant strategy for a 
single round. In this approach the principal chooses such a mechanism 
and announces that each round the assessors will be rewarded according 
to this mechanism, and at the end of R rounds the assessor with the 
highest total of transfers will be declared the "best." If R is large 
enough the law of large numbers takes over, and i maximizes his 
average transfer by maximizing his expected transfer each round. 
Similarly he maximizes his probability of having the highest average 
transfer at the end of R rounds by maximizing his expected transfer 
each round. By the principal choosing his criterion of the best 
assessor as the one with highest average transfer after R rounds the 
principal brings into harm�ny the assessor' s  two goals �maximizing 
expected transfers round by round and maximizing the probability of 
being declared the best assessor. By choosing a mechanism with a truth 
revealing dominant strategy the principal provides an incentive for 
truthful revelation round by round. We return to this approach in 
Section IX. 
A fourth approach is for the principal to exploit the properties 
of a strategic mechanism to reveal the best assessor. In this approach 
the principal chooses a strategic mechanism and announces that each 
round the assessors will be rewarded according to this transfer and 
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at the end of R rounds the assessor with the highest average transfer 
will be declared the best . The idea is that assessors with more 
information and inference skill will be able to exploit the strategic 
opportunities of the rule more efficiently than others and will rise 
to the top more quickly. 
If this speculation is correct there may be a tradeoff: worse 
consensus estimates round by round but more efficient identification 
of the best assessor after R rounds. ("Worse" and "more efficient" 
are relative to a mechanism with truthful dominant strategy round 
by round. ) These notions are made more precise for two models of 
information generation in Section IX and the Appendix. This speculation 
is investigated for the perimutuel mechanism, which is strategic, 
but first we need to know something of its strategic properties. 
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VII. Strategy in the Parimutual Mechanism 
This section derives some of the strategic properties of the 
parimutuel mechanism and compares the mechanism with others having 
truth revealing, dominant strategies. 
Definition. A parimutuel mechanism is a transfer function 
in the form: 
(5) t .. i 
pici 
q 
Ci 
if X = 1 and not all pi • 0 
if X = 0 and not all pi = 1
otherwise 
where 0 5_ ci < 1, all i; L c1 = l; and q = L pici. 
Clearly L ti = 1 for all pi and X; thus the mechanism is
budget controlled. The transfer is in the form of Bayes Theorem -- if 
in terms of Robert's model the principal sets ci • P (0i), then 
ti is the principal's posterior probability that i is the "best" 
assessor. The mechanism is also the same as a parimutuel betting 
rule. In a two horse race, where q is the consensus probability 
of X = 1 (or (1 - q) I q is the odds ore sees on the totalizer 
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for X = O); ci is the fiinction of the total betting pool put down 
by i; pi is the fraction of i's wager placed on X"' l; and ti is 
6the fraction of the total betting pool won by i. 
'When there are repeated applications of the parimutuel mechanism 
the connection between (5) and (4) is as follows. Set ci = P (Si) for 
the first round; for round r set ci equal to ti of the preceding round. 
Then i's transfer in the final round tiR is P (Biix). We will call 
this special case of the parimutuel mechanism a Bayesian mechanism. 
Assessor i's credibility ci evolves over time and his final transfer 
is his final credibility. For the Bayesian mechanism i is rewarded 
tiR and he attempts to maximize E (tir). Unfortunately the analysis of
i's strategy is complicated. His global strategy is coupled round 
by round, and it can be shown that maximization of expected final 
transfer is not in general consistent with maximizing the expected 
7 transfer round by round. 
The following three theorems characterize some of the properties 
of a single round parimutuel mechanism. Expected transfer maximization 
is assumed as a background condition. Proofs are in the Appendix. 
Theorem 6 .  (Due to James Gerard and Joshua Foreman.) For the 
paramutuel mechanism with two assessor's, i's reaction f unction is 
pi 
1 - pj
c
j 
(1 +yPiPj ) 
Ci (1 +VPiPj ) 
where j � i and 
- 1-p 
pi - __ 
i. 
pi 
1-p 
p j "' --=--:.L­p j 
as long as i's strategy is not 0 or 1 and O <ci< 1. Further, 
if 'P1=P2 , 
then there is a truth revealing Nash equilibrium at p =p and p =p . 1 1 2 2 
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(Calculati0n ef reaction functions for a grid of varying ci and pi
shows that there is usually a unique interior Nash equilibrium, but 
there are examples of multiple interior equilibria. )  
Theorem 7. Choose any arbitrarily small h (O < h < .5). 
When each assessor ' s  strategy space is restricted to [h ,  1 - h], 
there exists a Nash equilibrium for the parimutuel mechanism. 
(The restriction is to remove the two points of discontinuity, 
at pi = 0 ,  all i ;  and pi = 1 ,  all i . )
Theorem 8. For the parimutuel mechanism, i reports pi greater
than the consensus of others if pi > qi ; reports pi < qi if
pi < qi ; and reports pi• qi if pi= qi . 
Reaction functions are plotted in Figure 2 for a case of two 
assessors , where p1 = . 2, and 1'"2 • .6 and c1 = .4. As can be seen
for this case the Nash equilibrium is not far from the point of 
8 truthful revelation , its displacement according to Theorem 8. The 
displacement is not always small, however , as shown by the corollary 
to follow. 
Definition. An assessor follows a zero-one knife edge strategy 
if he reports 0 when pi < qi, 1 when pi > qi , and pi when pi= qi .
Corollary . For the parimutuel mechanism i ' s  strategy converges 
to a zero-one knife edge strategy as ci + 0 .
As ci declines , convergence t o  a knife edge,  z ero-one strategy
for i is rapid . This can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 where regions of 
the zero-one strategy and the bluntness of the knife edge are shown 
for ci = . 1  and ci = . 01 . In racetrack betting , N can be 10, 000
or more and each ci is correspondingly small .  Thus a n  expected value
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Figure 2 
REACTION FUNCTIONS 
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maximizing bettor at a parimutuel track has a strategy which is 
virtually knife edge , zero-one. And in fact parimutuel betting 
c0111111only follows this pattern (all of one ' s  wager on one horse, for 
each race) . 
To put the expected transfer for the parimutuel mechanism on the 
same figure as those of mechanism f '  and the Brier , scale the 
parimutuel mechanism by multiplying its transfers by N. 
Figure 5 makes the comparison when pi • .4, ci = . 1  and pj = .6.  
(As noted in Figure 4 the information sets differ for the three 
mechanisms . )  Clearly, at the point of revelation (0 for the parimutuel , 
and . 4  for the others) the slope of the expected transfer function is 
steepest for the parimutuel mechanism (the others being zero) . In a 
s ense this suggests that the parimutuel mechanism provides the 
strongest incentives for i to sharpen his j udgment of pi . Actually ,
however , for the parimutuel mechanism i ' s  incentive is to sharpen 
his j udgment of pi "j ust enough" to decide which side of the knife
edge to choose (if ci is sufficiently small to elicit a z ero-one
strategy , as it is in this case) • 
Sharpness for the Brier mechanism and mechanism f '  is more directly 
comparable . For mechanisms with truthful strategies (such as these) 
local convexity at pi defines a notion of sharpness for i .  As shown 
in Figure 5 and derived analytically in Section V, the radius of 
curvature is smaller for mechanism f ' . This means that being a little 
off in one ' s  judgment of l>i makes more difference in the mechanism f '  
compared with the Brier . 
..... 
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Figure 5 
Expected Transfer as a Function of 
Revealed Probability 
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(a) Parimutuel (budget controlled to N) 
(b) Brier (adjusted for budget control at N) 
(c) Brier 
(d) Mechanism f' 
For the three mechanisms pi= .4 , pj = .6 (jfi);
N = 10; and ci = 1.
At the time i reveals pi ' his information includes
qi for (a) by i has no direct information on pj for (d) .
For (d) i has a triangular prior on qi , peaked at pi.
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To further compare the (scaled) parimutuel mechanism, with 
mechanism f ,  define ci to be the same for both mechanisms and define
ci to be the same for both mechanisms and defined so that ci is small
for large N .  Then for large N the gap between q and qi i s  small.
Neglecting the gap between q and qi and the exceptional cases , we can 
put the two mechanisms side by side : 
Scaled 
parimutuel Mechanism f 
1 1 - q if X = 1 and pi > q q 
ti .. � 1 
1-q q if X = 0 and pi < q
The two mechanisms have the same orientation, but for the same 
budget bound N there is a far greater opportunity for a big win in 
the parimutuel mechanism. For the parimutuel mechanism i has a 
chance at a large fraction of the principal's budget ceilign N .  For 
mechanism f ,  i can never do better than 1 .  However , mechanism f is 
cheaper for the principal than the scaled parimutuel mechanism because 
the former never obtains its budget bound while the latter always does . 
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VIII . Rational Expectations 
So far we have specified little about how one i might gain 
information about pj through · the revealed pj . For mechanism f
we have noted (see note 3) that to establish an incentive to follow 
a truthful dominant strategy the principal needs to keep i at least 
somewhat uncertain of pj at the time of i ' s  own revelation . For the
mechanisms built on proper scoring rules there is no such strategic 
consideration on the part of the principal . Nonetheless , if the 
principal wants to identify the best assessors , he may not want some 
less informed i to improve his pi by observing a more informed j ' s
pj which reveals information on pj .
In some ways the parimutuel mechanism is the most interesting 
for developing models of ra tional expectations.  The consensus estimate 
q -- equivalent to the payoff odds on the totalizer of a racetrack --
functions like a price signal in a market. Individuals in a market 
do not see others ' individual actions , but they see an aggregative 
summary in market prices . Similarly , in the parimutuel mechanism 
individuals do not see others ' revealed assessments individually , but 
they do see and react to the aggregative q .  In parimutuel betting the 
consensus q (or the equivalent) is prominantly displayed on a 
totalizer and a limited form of recontracting is allowed while q 
9 shifts in response to betting . And in the same way than an
individual may gain information from an aggregative price , i can 
modify his judgment pi in response to the q he sees on the totalizer .
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Developing a rational expectations model requires specifying the 
process of tatonnement or recontracting and the flows of information 
among assessors . While doing so would be beyond the scope of this 
paper , it is worth suggesting that Theorem 8 provides favorable 
conditions for such models .  A less informed bettor j ,  i f  he  knows he 
is less informed , is more likely to revise pj farther toward q than 
a well informed assessor . (Theorem 8 holds for the full consensus q 
as well as the others ' consensus qi . )  The more an assessor approaches
q the less effect he has on it. A more informed i presumably is less 
influenced by q in forming and modifying his lfi · And by holding to
his better informed pi he pulls q in direction of pi . (If he believes
the true probability of X • 1 is greater than the consensus q, he 
bets on X, tending to increase q ,  and the reverse if ]ii < q . )  While
there are other factors to consider , it appears there is a tendency in 
racetrack betting for the uninformed to follow the lead of the informed , 
with the resulting q weighted toward the lfj of the informed .
lo
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IX .  Identifying the Best Assessor 
In this section a Monte Carlo simulation is used to estimate the 
probability of identifying the best assessor under three mechanisms --
the Brier , the parimutuel , and the Groves-like � for a simple model 
of the assessors ' information. The model is chosen to reflect the 
practical problem of risk assessment for potential carcinogens . For 
this problem there are a small number of assessors , a limited number 
of assessments ,  and the possibility of bias as well as variance in 
each assessor ' s  best j udgment. The model of the assessor ' s  information , 
simple as it is , appears to preclude direct analytical treatment . 
As in Section VI define the best assessor i '  in terms of an 
underlying model of information generation, where i' has more informa­
* 
tion on pr than any other i .  Write i ' s  average transfer after
1 RR rounds ti • R �l 
tir where tir is the transfer to i in round r ,rs 
and formalize a notion of identifiability as follows : 
Definition. The best i '  is identifiable in R rounds if 
Pr (ti > tj , all j ;. i) is maximized by i • i '  • 
Definition . The probability of identifying i '  (the best i) is 
Pr (ti, > tj , all j ;. i ' ) .
Befere we compare identifiability for the three mechanisms , we 
briefly ask what is the role of strategic revelation for identifiability 
in the parimutuel mechanism. For an analytically tractible example , 
we find that strategic revelation is essential to identifiability. 
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In the example ,  there are many assessors (N is large as in race 
track betting) and ci is reset to l/N each round . A poorly informed 
* 
assessor j forms a judgment of pr by observing two observations on 
* 
a Bernoulli process with parameter pr ; the best i' forms his judgment
* of pr by observing an infinite number from the same process (i '  knows 
* 
pr) .
For this extreme example of disparity of information among the 
N - 1 poorly informed j and the best informed i ' , we find that if 
the assessors , contrary to their incentives under the parimutuel 
mechanism, somehow reported truthfully, the best i' would not be 
identifiable , for any R. (Note that this version of the parimutuel 
mechanism is not the Bayesian mechanism, where the ci evolve over 
time.  However ,  if the assessors respond to their incentives to  report 
strategically , i '  becomes identifiable , and the probability of 
identifying i'  goes to 1 as R goes to infinity. Details and derivations 
are in the Appendix. 
The underlying reason for nonidentif iability in the parimutuel 
* mechanism is that with truthful reporting q converges to p ,  and when 
* 
q = p the expected transfer becomes 1 no matter the reported pi
(see definition (5) and scale by N) . Similarly , for mechanism f if 
* qi converges to p there is no identifiability as R � � (note that if
* * *2 qi = p ,  i ' s  expected transfer is p - p no matter what the reported
* pi) .  In contrast ,  if qi = p then i '  can still be identified for the 
Brier mechanism. A specific example is given in the Appendix . 
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* However , when qi p p the situation is quite different . The
* 
case where we expect qi p p can arise as follows , A chemical is
* 
either a carcinogen (X • 1)  or not (X • O) ; and p is also either 0 or 1 .  
Assessors develop information on the possible carcinogenicity of the 
chemical but their information is imperfect and hence 0 < lii < 1
(only perfect information would lead to pi = 0 or pi • 1) and
thus each consensus qi is also interior . For the simulation model ,
we assume there are R chemicals to assess and each assessor i has 
information which suggests either Xr = 1 or Xr = 0 .  The imperfec­
tion of i ' s  information is characterized by false positive and false 
negative probabilities for i :  
FPi = Pr ( i ' s  information suggests Xr = l jXr = O)
FNi = Pr (i ' s information suggests Xr = O jXr = 1)
Suppose there is one i = i' with clearly superior information : 
for this i '  FPi'  < FPj and FNi , < FNj for j p i I •
In this model there is an underlying prevalence rate for 
carcinogens and each assessor i uses this rate to calculate pi
according to the Bayes Theorem. The principal does not know the 
FNi ' FPi or the prevalence rate, but declares the assessor with the
highest average transfer after R rounds to be the best assessor . 
Under these conditions a Monte Carlo simulation can be used 
to estimate the probability of identifying i 1 • For this model of 
information the qualitative results appear similar for various 
values of the prevalence rate and error rates , and the following 
numbers are illustrative.  
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In the testing programs of the National Cancer Institute and the 
National Toxicology Program, the rate of positives for chemicals in 
rodent bioassays is about 30 percenc . (This prevalence rate is higher 
than what is suspected as the prevalence of carcinogens over all 
chemicals , because che.micals selected for testing are among the more 
suspicious . )  Suppose for the best assessor the false positive 
probability is 10 percent and false negative probability is 15 percent ; 
and for the others the false positive rate is 15 percent and false 
negative probability is 20 percent. By supposition there is some 
difference, but not a great difference , between the best assessor and 
the others . Finally suppose that there are thirty chemicals to assess 
and ten assessors . These numbers appear plausible for the problem of 
assessing potential carcinogens . 
For the Brier mechanism the probability of correctly identifying 
i '  as the best assessor after 30 rounds is estimated by the simulation 
to be . 31 .  But if the principal chooses the parimutuel mechanism 
the probability of correctly identifying the best assessor after 
30 rounds is . 59 .  The difference tends t o  confirm our earlier 
intuition that a strategic mechanism may reveal the best assessor 
more efficiently than a mechanism with truthful dominant strategies . 
But as a final surprise the Groves-like mechanism f does better than 
either . If the principal chooses this mechanism the probability of 
identifying the best assessor after 30 rounds is . 64 .  Thus,  for this 
model of the assessors ' information, the principal need not give up 
truthful reporting for greater efficiency in identifying the best 
assessor . 
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These differences in identifiability among the three mechanisms 
are remarkable and suggest further research. It would be interesting 
to investigate further the conditions of identifiability and their 
impact on individual incentives . It would also be interesting to 
investigate a multiround version of mechanism f ,  where after several 
initial rounds ci in round r is set equal to the smn of his previous
transfers divided by the smn of everyone ' s  previous transfers . Then 
the ci would evolve through time as in theBayesian mechanism. Because
i has truthful dominant strategy no matter the value of qi' changing
ci has no effect on i ' s  strategy (unlike the Bayesian mechanism) . If
there is identifiability , by allowing i ' s credibility to evolve over 
time ,  better consensus estimates might be obtained -- because the 
credibilities of the better informed assessors would tend to increase,  
and decrease for the more poorly informed assessors . 
Another line of research is suggested by noting that under 
mechanism f ,  for any fixed qi assessor i gets the same transfer for all
pi reported greater than qi' and the same transfer for all pi reported
less than qi . The insensitivity of i ' s  transfer to pi (within the
appropriate ranges) suggests an elicitation technique which might have 
practical value . 
In many cases of actual risk assessment incentive compatibility 
is not the apparent issue .11 In many cases the stated problem is not
the willingness of assessors to report truthfully their best judgments , 
but to make them in a quantified form. Experts of ten express reluctance 
in reporting nmnerical probability assessments because they feel that 
two decimal places (or even one) overstate and misrepresent the 
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"accuracy" they attach to their judgments . A Bayesian would say that 
stating a subj ective probability to two decimal places does not imply 
firm conviction of its "accuracy" -- nonetheless the reluctance on 
the part of the experts is real.  
A possible resolution of this problem is to elicit judgments 
in the following way . A trial consensus estimate is put on a board 
for all to see. Each assessor is asked if he believes that the 
true likelihood of the event being assessed is higher , lower , or 
equal to that trial value. The tri.al value is shifted up or down 
12 until a median estimate is obtained . From this benchmark, as the 
second step numerical estimates are elicited , to whatever degree of 
accuracy the assessors feel comfortable with . In this elicitation 
technique , the truthful dominant strategy of mechanism f remains but 
the incentive to follow it is weakened . The Appendix and further 
simulation tentatively suggest that even at this first stage, where 
only trichotomies are elicited , useful consensus estimates can be 
generated and i '  can be identified under all three mechanisms . These 
and other speculations could be sharpened in terms of specific models 
of information generation and by direct experiments . 
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X.  Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a model of risk assessment based 
on a structural analogy with a model of public goods demand revelation. 
This analogy provides a new and more formal way of viewing the problem 
of risk assessment . With the framework we have introduced a new 
mechanism with truthful dominant strategy for revelation of best 
j udgmental probabilities . This mechanism, analogous to the Groves 
mechanism for public good s ,  is then compared with proper scoring rules 
(especially the Brier rule) and the parimutuel mechanism. There are 
several surprises in the comparisons , not the least of which is that 
the new mechanism appears to perform relatively well compared with 
other existing mechanisms . 
The paper adopts an approach to probability in between those of 
a strict Bayesian and a strict frequentist .  For a strict Bayesian 
every event is unique and probabilities are subj ective degrees of 
belief which can be validated only in a limited way . Validation of 
personal probabilities is internal in the sense that it refers to 
consistency with Savage ' s  (or someone else ' s) axiom system defining 
"rationality" and does not depend on whether or not the predicted 
event actually occurred . Such validation is limited because for a 
given event widely differing personal probabilities are consistent 
with the axiom system. 
For a strict frequentist ,  the notion of probability is 
undefinable when we are dealing with unique events , as we often are in 
risk assessmenl . An event must be held constant an� repeatable many 
times for its probability to be definable. In the paper , we let the 
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predicted events be unique and varying one from another but hold 
constant something else,  the predictive capability of each assessor . 
With each assessor ' s  "technique" held constant over a series of 
predictions of unique and varying events identification of assessors 
with better techniques may be possible . In this way an assessor ' s  
predictive capability can be validated beyond its consistency with 
an axiom system to reference with the outcomes of predicted events 
and yet this validation does not require repeatable events . 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 6 .  We assume that i observes pj or that recontrac­
ting is possible . For convenience write pj as qi and cj as (1-ci) and 
omit the subscript i .  Let k • q (l-c ) /c and m = (1-q) (l-c ) /c and 
rewrite condition (5) as 
t 
(1 + kp-1)-1 
-1 -1 (1 + m (l-p) ) 
if x = 1 
if x = 0 
(As we are computing the reaction function for interior p and q ,  we 
do not bother with the definition of t for the two singular points 
(p , q ,X) • (0 , 0 ,1 )  or (1 , 1 , 0) . )  For each fixed c , q ,  and p the expected
transfer is a function of p ;  write the expected transfer T(p) and 
T(p) - -1 -1 -
-1 -1 p (l + kp ) + (1 - p) (l + m(l - p) ) 
By direct calculation 
T '  pk 
(p +k) 2
T" � + (p + k) 
(1 -ji)m 
2 (1 - p  +m) 
2 (1 -p)m 
3 (1 - p +m) 
p ./< -k or m + 1 
p 1 k or m + 1.  
A2 
By definition k > 0 and m > 0 ,  as  by assumption 0 < c < 1 
and 0 < q < 1 .  So T" (p) < 0 for p £ (-k, m+l) . Because T is 
everywhere concave over (-k, m+l) , T' • 0 for only one p in this
interval , and this p defines a maximum. Setting T '  • 0 yields 
the first order condition 
(7) 1 -pc - q(l - c) r;:­pc + q (l - c) = V PQ where Q = .!...:..s. q 
Because the LHS is always positive for p ,  q and c in the open 
unit interval , only the positive root on the RHS applies.  Solving 
for p ,  
(8) P = 1 - q (1 - c) (l + � 
c(l +\IFQ )
When p1 • Pz , substitution of p1 = Pz = p1 into each assessor 's  
reaction function and check of the four possible boundary cases confirms 
that p1 • p1 and Pz = Pz is a Nash equilibrium.
Q . E .D . 
( I  wish to th ank James Gerard and Joshua Foreman for the original 
proof of Theorem 6 . )  
Proof of Theorem 7 .  Write 
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q ..i 
N 
L pj cj / (1-c . ) ,j;i  J. the consensus 
of everyone but i .  Substitution of qi into (5) shows that a s  far a s  i
is concerned he is playing against a single (aggregate) player qi with 
credibility (1-ci) .  Omit the subscript i and define the RHS of
condition (8) as S (q) . S (q) is i ' s  reaction function if his reaction 
is inside (h, h - h) . Define 
R(q} 
{ h if S {q )  < h
1-h if S (q )  .?_ 1 - h  
S {q) otherwise 
Since S {q) in continuous in q, R (q) is also continuous . If T is 
maximized over p E (-k , m + 1) by p0 < h (by p0 > 1 - h) , then T is
maximized by h (by 1 - h) over p E [h,  1 - h] because T is everywhere 
concave over the bigger interval . 
Thus R(q) is i ' s  reaction function for the strategy space 
[h ,  1 - h] , including boundary reactions . Return to the original 
notation and write R {q) as R1(p1, • • •  ,p1_1 ,pi+l ' ' " ' 'pN) for i ' s
reaction function . Similarly , construct reaction functions Rj for each
of the other assessors and form the composite function R = (R1 ,R2 , • • .  �) .
Then R is also continuous and maps [h, 1 - h]N into itself . As
[h,  1 - h]N is convex and compact,  Brouwer ' s  fixed point theorem applies .
This means there exists at least one point (p1 ,p2 , • • • ,pN) which leads
to no change under application of the composite reaction function. By 
definition this is a Nash equilibrium. 
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Proof of Theorem 8 .  Say Pi < qi .
omitting the subscript i ,  
Then Pi > Qi ' and from (7) ,
1 - pc - q(l - c) 
pc + q (l - c)  = vPQ .. l..=__g_q 
p (l - E )  • q + Eq (l - c)/c  
(8) p > q + Eq(l - c)/c  > q 
E 
q for some E > O ;  so 
When P1 > ql ' E < 0 and the inequalities in (8) are reversed .
Then p1 "' q1 , E = 0 .
Q .E .D .  
Proof of Corollary.  Observe in condition (8)  that for fixed 
pi > qi and hence fixed E > 0, pi goes to its upper boundary as
ci + O .  Similarly if  pi < qi ' pi goes to its lower boundary as
Ci + 0.
Q .E .D .  
AS 
Nonidentifiability in the Parimutuel Mechanism 
In the first model described in Section IX i '  (the best i) knows 
* * pr (pr can change from round to round) ;  each other j observes a
* 
binomial random variable with parameters (pr ' 2 ) , where each of
N - 1 observations for the N - 1 j ' s  is drawn independently . 
* 
Assessor j ' s best judgment of pr is :
{ w.p.  
*2 (j observes (1 ,1) pr
* * 
Pj r  = .5 w.p .  2pr (l - pr) (j observes (1 ,0) or (0 , 1)
0 w. p .  ( 1  - �r) 2 (j observes (0 ,0)
the 
The parimutuel transfer to i in round r ,  tir ' is defined as in (5)
except all transfers are multiplied by N to achieve budget control 
at level N .  
Suppose,  contrary t o  their strategic incentives each assessor 
reports truthfully . By the Bernoulli law of large numbers ,  with N 
large , the fraction of N reporting 1 approximates (omitting subscript r) 
*2 * * p (N - l) /N;  the fraction reporting . 5  approximates 2p (l - p) (N - l ) /N ;  
* 2 and the fraction reporting 0 approximates (1 - p) (N - l)/N.  The 
* fraction reporting p is of course exactly l/N . With large N and 
Ci = l/N (all i) the consensus
1 q 
"' N 2: pi converges to
*2 * * *2 * (l)p (N - 1) + ( . 5) 2p(l  - p) (N - 1) + (0) (1 - p ) (N - 1) + p = � 
N 
By the definition of the parimutuel mechanism (5) it is clear 
* 2 that when X "' 0 an expected number of (1 - p) (N - 1) bad assessors 
A6 
will have higher transfers than i ' , and when X • 1 ,  and expected 
number of 
* *2 (2p - p ) (N - 1) bad assessors will have higher transfers . 
However ,  as R increases ti 'R converges to
* With truthful reporting qr converges to pr ' and
R 
.! L Eti 'r • R r•l 
E(ti ' r) converges
to 1 .  (This last result follows from (5) in Section VIII (scaled by N) . 
As the budget is controlled to N and the other j are symmetric to each 
other , they split the remaining budget equally in expectation, each 
j receiving an expected transfer of (N - l) / (N - 1) • 1 per round .
In consequence i 1  has the same expected transfer as each j .  With this 
equality in expectation i' remains unidentifiable for any number of 
rounds , even though his information 1s clearly superior to the others . 
Next suppose that each assessor exploits the mechanism as best he 
can . Each maximizes his expected transfer each round . For 
* 
0 < pr < . 5  the corresponding Nash equilibrium is easily computed to 
have a consensus estimate (omitting the subscript r) 
* * * * q • p (2 - p) (N - l)/N.  Because q > p (for large N and p < . 5 ) ,
* long shots are overbet , with a discontinuity in q ,  as a function of p ,  
* 
at p = . 5 .  The discontinuity is an artifact o f  the model . I f  j 
made more than two observations on the Bernoulli process there would be 
more jumps but smaller ones . It can be shown that as the number of 
j ' s observations increases the gap between the Nash equilibrium q and 
* p goes to zero . Also it seems clear that when X is more than 
dichotomous (more than two horses in a race) the amount of overbetting 
on long shots decreases . 
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An empirical study on racetrack betting by Hoerl and Fallin (1974) 
indicates that longshots are in fact overbet . but the overbetting is 
small with q (odds on the totalizer) an excellent predictor of the 
order of finish. 
Returning to the Nash equilibrium of the example . we find i '  
- * reports pi , .. o. because pi ' • p < q .  The expected transfer for i '  is
* 
1 (1 - p)  
y-:-q 
l -� .--*2)-* 1 2p - p c1 - p) + 'N * 1 - p 
With probability 
*2 * * * *2 p + 2p(l - p) - 2p - p • badly informed assessor j 
will have pj > q and will report pj .. 1. When j reports - 1 his
* * 2 expected transfer is p/q.  With probability (1 - p) • pj is less
than q and j reports pj • O. When j reports 0 his expected transfer is
* 
(1 - p) / (l - q) . So j ' s expectation over the two possibilities is 
* 
* *2 * * 2 * N * 1 - p (2p - p )p/q + (1 - p) (1 - p) / (l - q) '" 'N=l p + * *2 
1 + (2p - p 
) 
* 2N(l  - p) 
* 
For large N ,  E(ti ' r) converges to 1/ (1 - p ) and E(tj r)
* converges to 1 .  As p < . 5 .  E(ti '  ) > E(t . ) for large N .r Jr 
is identifiable with strategic revelation. 
Hence i '  
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* Having q close but not equal to p has advantages for a racetrack 
operator who is more interested in filling the stands and betting lines 
than a "good consensus estimate" or "identifiability of i".  (The 
principal is more interested in the third goal . strong individual 
incentives for the assessors to take part in the assessment exercise. ) 
* With q close to p .  there is protection of the Saturday duffers who can 
bet randomly and have almost fair bets . (With strategic revelation. 
if * q .. p .  random betting does just as well as any other , see (5) . )  
* But with q not equal but close to p ,  there is an edge in favor of the 
insiders .  The duffers have the thrill of  betting and almost holding 
their own against the insiders even with worthless information. 
insiders systematically do better . as they exploit the difference 
* 
The 
between q and p .  although they probably succumb to the house percentage 
eventually . And for the parimutuel mechanism there is the prospect 
of a big win. The parimutuel is designed . perhaps inadvertantly . 
for strong gambling incentives among the bettors . 
Expectations for i '  and j can also be calculated for the Brier and 
Groves-like mechanisms for this same model of information generation. 
Truthful reporting leads to an expected transfer to i' in the Brier 
*2 *mechanism of p - p + 1 and an expected transfer to j of 
*2 * (l . 5) p  - (l .5 )p  + 1 .  Because former is  greater than the latter . 
there is identifiability in the Brier mechanism for this model of 
information. For mechanism f the expected transfer to i1 and to j 
is the same . * *2 p - p • so there is no identifiability for this model
of informa tion. For this model of information the percent difference 
between the expectations of i '  and j can easily be shown to be 
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greater under strategic reporting in the parimutuel mechanism than 
under truthful reporting in the Brier. This suggests that the pari­
mutuel mechanism may be more efficient in identifying the best assessor 
in a limited number of rounds . The conj ecture is confirmed for a 
different model of information generation in Section IX, where the 
small sample properties (for small N as well as small R) and 
statistical dependencies among the ti within rounds are dealt with
by Monte Carlo simulation . 
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Footnotes 
For a definition of individual rationality in public goods demand 
revelation see Green and Laffont (1979) p .  121. 
Later , for the parimutuel mechanism we will need to restrict i ' s  
strategy space . For the public goods model i ' s  strategy space for 
wi is the real line . The definition could easily be generalized
for more than a dichotomous X .  
As another parallel note that if i knew for sure that qi > pi ,
revelation biased down would be j ust as good as truthful revelation. 
For truthful revelation to have an expected value strictly greater 
than that for any other strategy , i must attach some probability 
weight to both q > p and q < p, weight to both cases 1 and 2 .  
In the same way even though truthful revelation is the unique 
dominant strategy for the Groves mechanism, overstatement of 
willingness to pay is just as good if i is certain that 
N 
L w .  > vi and understatement ifj7'i J 
N 
L: w < vrj7'i j 
For truthful 
revelation to be strictly better each individual must attach some 
probability weight to his pivot being both above and below his 
true valuation . 
Monotonicity is defined as follows . Let A be the lottery where i 
wins a with probability p and wins b with probability 1 - p ;  
and let A '  be the lottery where i wins a w.p .  p '  and b w . p .  1 - p ' . 
Then if i prefers a to b ,  i prefers lottery A to A 1 <•> p > p 1 •
5 
6 
For an application of Theorem 4 let g be the Brier mechanism. Then 
i wins 1 2 
- -w.p .  - pi + 2pipi + 1 - pi and 0 w.p .
2 - -pi - wpipi + pi.
This mechanism is similar to, but sharper than the one proposed by 
Grether . In Grether ' s  mechanism, after pi is elicited two random 
variables Y and Z are drawn, each uniform over [0 ,1] . If y < pi,
i wins 1 if X � li if Y ..::_ pi i wins 1 if Z > Y ;  otherwise i wins 
nothing . Thus i wins 1 w .p .  (-pi
2 + 2pipi + 1) /2 and 0 otherwise .
Taking as a measure of sharpness the second derivative 
w . r .  + pi ' the Brier mechanism is twice as sharp as Grether 1 s .
If the stakes were doubled in Grether ' s  mechanism there would be 
equal sharpness in the expected transfer .  But then the expected 
transfer in Grether ' s  mechanism would be larger than for Brier ' s ,  
and thus the principal would have to spend a higher expected budget 
to achieve the same sharpness.  
Joshua Foreman pointed out to me the close connection between Bayes 
rule and the parimutuel mechanism. In Page (1977 )  the transfer 
mechanism (5) was called a Bayesian game . In application of the 
parimutuel betting rule the betting pool is first reduced by a 
fraction equal to the "house percentage , "  before it is divided 
among the winners according to (5) . 
7 Winkler (1969) has shown , however , that for N • 2 when i is
rewarded log (tiR/tjR) is has a truth revealing , expected value
maximizing s trategy and the mechanism boils down to a logarithmic 
proper scoring rule . This reward structure lacks individual 
rationality , as b- -"'· 
8 For the parimutuel mechanism with two assessors in a Nash equilibrium,
if it is interior , the consensus odds ratio (1 - q ) /q  is the 
geometric mean of i ' s  revealed odds (1 - pi) /pi and j ' s  true
odds (1 - pj ) /Pj ; it is also the geometric mean of j ' s  revealed
odds and i ' s  true odds . Moreover , the revealed consensus lies 
between p1 and lf2 • This result follows immediately from the first
order condition (7) of the Appendix . 
9 It is possible to define a parimutuel mechanism in which i is
ignorant of q at the time he reveals pi . In such a case i would
base his s trategy on his Bayesian priors of the other p . •  However , 
J 
existing parimutuel mechanisms reveal q during the betting period . 
lO For a formal model of polls and voting behavior where the uninformed
follow the lead of the informed see McKelvey and Ordeshook (draft) . 
11 It is widely believed that the presense or absence of monetary
transfers s trongly affects behavior in experimental settings . 
However , in two papers dealing with judgmental probabilities 
Grether (197 9 ,  1980) found the role of monetary incentives 
"surprisingly weak. " 
12 An alternative to the median is as follows . The trial value is 
shifted until the number reporting "higher" equals the trial value. 
Then this benchmark value is the same as what would be obtained 
as a Nash equilibrium for the parimutuel mechanism with small ci
and knife edge , zero-one strategies . In the simulation the median 
benchmark yielded slightly higher probabilities of identification 
compared with this alternative . Gib Bogle suggested the median 
benchmark. 
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